We address the problem of locating facilities on the [0, 1] interval based on reports from strategic agents. The cost of each agent is her distance to the closest facility, and the global objective is to minimize either the maximum cost of an agent or the social cost.
Introduction
We consider a setting in which several agents are located on a line, and a central planner intends to place a facility at some point upon that line. Each of the agents seeks to be as close as possible to the facility -the cost of an agent is her distance to the facility. The planner wishes to minimize some global objective -either the average or the maximum cost of an agent. In some cases, agents might misreport their preference in order to obtain a better outcome from their perspective. We aim to devise truthful mechanisms, in which no agent can benefit from misreporting, regardless of the reports of the other agents.
In the literature, the most common measure for assessing a mechanism's efficiency is the approximation ratio -the worst-case ratio (over any location profile) between the global cost of the mechanism and that of the optimal mechanism. In this paper, we strive to minimize the additive error -the worst-case difference between the same two values.
To illustrate the difference between these two error functions, consider the classical facility location problem in which a municipality wants to build a library on one of its streets in order to serve the residents of the street. Optimizing over the approximation ratio might guarantee, for instance, that no resident will need to walk to the library more than 2 times the maximal walking distance of an agent in the optimal assignment. In contrast, optimizing over the additive error might guarantee that no agent will need to walk to the library for more than 3 kilometers over the optimal assignment. This example demonstrates that optimizing over the additive error guarantees efficiency with respect to a tangible and natural measure of absolute distance, and further provides a target function which is easily understood.
As opposed to the multiplicative error which is scale-invariant, by focusing on the additive error we sacrifice some efficiency in small instances (e.g., cases in which all residents are close to the library), in which the solutions are already quite good, so as to achieve a nearly optimal solution in larger instances (where the error is significantly higher). Indeed, in many cases some (large) instances are more important to the designer than other (smaller) instances, and the additive error accommodates for this need.
Clearly, when the size of the instance doubles, the additive error also doubles. However, in many different manifestations of the facility location problem, the domains are bounded. We restrict ourselves to such cases, i.e., in our setting the network is not R, but rather the [0, 1] segment of the line. Some examples of such settings include: -In the aforementioned example of locating a public library on a street, there is clearly a realistic bound on the length of a street, e.g., the length of the longest street in the city.
-A group of public officials needs to vote over the amount of resources to invest in a given policy (political, social, etc.). E.g., the Ministry of Education is faced with the decision of how much money the government should allocate to a reform in the school system. Note that in this case scaling can be done with respect to the size of the total education budget, since decisions which affect millions of dollars tend to be more important than those which affect thousands of dollars.
-A group of people sitting in a room want to collectively decide on the temperature of the air conditioner. Each person has their own ideal temperature, and some reasonable assumptions can be used to bound the minimal and maximal temperature values (e.g., it is probably safe to assume that nobody's true preference is 100 degrees Celsius).
-A group of colleagues wishes to set up a meeting in the upcoming week, and each one has an ideal time slot for the meeting. In some cases it is assumed that the utility function is single-peaked (see, e.g., [25] ). In this example, time provides a natural scale for the problem and it seems reasonable to get solutions where everybody waits at most 5 minutes more than the optimal, even if the optimal solution is 0. In contrast, if the optimal solution is 3 hours, a 2 approximation can be very bad.
Assuming quasi-linear utilities and allowing payments, then the well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is truthful and can achieve the optimal social cost (e.g., [17] ). However, in many real-life situations (such as in the examples previously mentioned) we restrict the use of money due to ethical, legal or other considerations. Given a set of votes, it is polytime to find the optimal outcome. However, when restricted to truthful mechanisms, we show that the optimal result cannot be selected in the general case. In other words, approximation is used to circumvent truthfulness and not computational hardness.
Our Contributions
We analyze the worst-case additive error between truthful mechanisms and the optimal mechanism for two objectives -the maximum cost and the average cost of an agent. The average cost is the same as the more commonly used objective of the social cost up to a multiplicative factor of n (the amount of agents), and we chose to focus on the average cost purely due to convenience as the results are easier to interpret without the parameter n.
It In Observation 2, we show that the error for the average cost grows at least linearly with n. Using this normalization, it is clear that since the network is the [0, 1] line, the additive error for both the average cost and the maximum cost of any mechanism is always between 0 and 1. For example, the trivial mechanism which locates the facility at 1/2 regardless of the agents' reports has an additive error of 1/2 for both the social and maximum cost. Our choice of an interval length of 1 is only done for the sake on convenience, and our results hold without loss of generality for any interval [0, M ] with an obvious multiplicative adjustment of the ratios (e.g., M/6 instead of 1/6).
In the paper, we show the following results:
-Locating a single facility ( Figure 1 ) -We provide tight bounds for all variations of this problem. For the average cost, it is well known that locating the facility on the median report is both truthful and optimal. For the maximum cost, we start by presenting a randomized lower bound of 1/6. In order to do so, we characterize the structure of the optimal mechanism, and show that it must locate the facility at one of five possible points (the leftmost and rightmost reports, the center between them, 0 and 1). We further show that it must be symmetric (a notion we formally define in the paper). We then present two location profiles, and utilize this characterization to exhibit the lower bound. We move on to devise a mechanism called BLRC, which is a probability distribution over two known mechanisms, that matches the lower bound of 1/6. In contrast, the best upper bound of currently known mechanisms was 1/4 (LRC: left-right-center by [23] ).
For deterministic mechanisms, we show a lower bound of 1/4. We then present a simple deterministic mechanism called phantom-half that matches this bound. In contrast, the best upper bound of any dictatorship is 1/2. Any dictatorship -Extensions to multiple facilities -We first show a trivial mechanism, Equal Spread, which locates k facilities with equal distances from one another (without using the instance data) and has a maximum cost of 1 2k−1 . We then extend the construction of the deterministic lower bound for one facility to the multiple-facility setting, and reach a lower bound of 1 6k , which shows that the result for this problem is Θ(1/k).
For the average cost, we present two extensions to Equal Spread which slightly improve the errorthe randomized paired-equal-cost (PEC) which has an error of 1 4k−2 (Theorem 22) and the deterministic election-parity-equal-cost (EPEC) mechanism which reaches an error of 3 8k−4 (Theorem 23). In addition, for the special case of 2 facilities, we show a deterministic mechanism based on percentiles which achieves an upper bound of 1/5 (compared to 1/4 by EPEC).
Related Work
The truthful facility location problem has rich roots. The initial focus was mainly on characterizing the class of truthful mechanisms -in 1980 Moulin characterized all deterministic truthful mechanisms for locating a facility on the line, when the preferences are single-peaked [20] , and this characterization was later extended to general graphs by Schummer and Vohra [25] .
Procaccia and Tennenholtz were the first to prove bounds on the approximation ratio of the gametheoretic facility location problem [23] . Their initial model has been extended by these authors and by others in many ways, and most of these extensions leads to additional bounds on the approximation ratio -The network was extended from the line to cycles ( [1] , [2] ), trees ( [1] , [11] ) and general graphs [1] ; Some papers consider building several facilities, where the cost of an agent is her distance to the closest facility (e.g. [19] , [18] , [14] , [15] ); Other papers look at heterogeneous facilities, i.e., facilities serving different purposes [26] ; Several papers consider a setting in which every agent possesses multiple locations and pays the sum of the distances to her locations ( [23] , [19] ); Additional objective functions were considered besides the maximum cost and the social cost, for instance the L 2 norm [11] or the minimax envy [6] (in the latter, the approximation was done with an additive error); Additional papers consider different preferences of the agents, for instance doubly-peaked preferences [12] , "obnoxious facility location" in which agents want to be as far away as possible from the facility [7] , settings which combine agents with ordinary preferences and agents who wish to be far from the facility ( [9] , [28]); Another direction that was researched is the tradeoff between the approximation ratio and the variance ( [24] ); Some papers consider different methods of voting, for instance by restricting the outcome to a discrete set of candidates ( [8] , [27] , [10] ) or by using mediators [5] . When restricting the location of the facility to given candidates, minimizing the social cost of facility location problems has been associated to the notion of "distortion" ( [22] , [3] , [10] , [4] , [16] ).
Nissim et. al. also use additive errors for facility location, as an example of their framework which maintains differential privacy [21] . However, their model differs from our setting as they grant the mechanism the additional power to impose agents to connect to a specific facility. Imposition allows for better approximation ratios, as seen for instance in [13] .
Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is located at some point x i ∈ [0, 1]. The vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is known as a location profile. A deterministic mechanism for locating k facilities is a mapping from some location profile (the reports of the agents) to a set of k points on the interval (the chosen locations of the facilities), that is:
Assuming the facility locations are M (x) = {l 1 , . . . , l k }, the cost of point p is its distance to the closest facility: cost p (M, x) = min 1≤j≤k |l j − p|. The cost of agent i located at x i is defined as the cost of her location, cost xi (M, x). Each agent aims to minimize her cost.
A randomized mechanism is a mapping from a location profile to some distribution over k-tuples of locations:
The cost of agent i is the expected cost of this agent according to the probability distribution returned by the mechanism, that is:
A truthful mechanism M (also known as a strategyproof mechanism) is one in which an arbitrary agent cannot suffer from reporting her real location, regardless of the reports of the other agents:
For randomized mechanisms, these mechanisms are often denoted by the term truthful in expectation mechanisms, in order to distinguish them from universally truthful mechanisms (a stronger notion which we do not use in this paper, in which an agent cannot regret reporting her true location ex-post). For a location profile x and reported locations x ′ the average cost is:
. Note that we scale the sum of the agents' costs by a factor of n. For truthful mechanisms, we can drop the misreport in the notation and denote the average cost by AC(M, x). Given a location profile x, the optimal average cost is:
For a truthful mechanism M , the additive error given a location profile x is the difference between the average cost of M and the average cost of the optimal mechanism:
The additive error of a truthful mechanism M is the maximal error over any location profile:
Given location profile x and reported locations x ′ the maximum cost (max-cost in short) is:
Similarly to the average cost case, for a truthful mechanism M we denote the max-cost by M C(M, x). Given a location profile x, the optimal maximum cost is:
For a truthful mechanism M , the additive error given a location profile x is the difference between the maximum cost of M and the maximal cost of the optimal mechanism:
Given a location profile x, we denote the leftmost and rightmost points in x by x L and x R respectively. The center point between these two points is called
. We now show that lower bounds proven for few agents can also be extended to location profiles with arbitrarily many agents since the error grows at least linearly with the amount of agents. The first observation shows that any lower bound for both the maximum and average cost proven with a location profile with n agents also holds for any profile with q · n agents for an arbitrary positive integer q (i.e., for any profile with an even number of agents). Observation 1. Let M be a truthful mechanism which has an additive error of ǫ for any profile with q · n agents for some global cost function (either the maximum or the average cost) with q ≥ 1. Then there exists some truthful mechanism M ′ which has an additive error of ǫ for the same global cost function, for any profile with n agents.
Proof. Let M ′ be the mechanism which simulates M based on the location profile which duplicates each report q times. That is, for some input
In these profiles in which the profile is duplicated, the additive error of these mechanisms is the same (and therefore in the general case, the cost of M is at least as large as that of M ′ ): for the maximum cost it holds that:
For the average cost, both the numerator and the denominator are multiplied by q:
Clearly, the cost of the optimal mechanism is the same for both of these cases as well. It is only left to prove truthfulness under M ′ . This holds due to the lemma by Lu et al. in [18] in which they show that any strategyproof (that is, truthful according to our terminology) mechanism is also partial group strategyproof. A mechanism is defined to be partial group strategyproof if for any group of agents on the same location, each individual cannot benefit if they misreport simultaneously. Formally, given a non-empty set S ⊂ N , profile x = (x S , x −S ) where x S = (x, . . . , x) for some x, and some misreported locations x ′ S it holds that for any i ∈ S:
If there had been some beneficial deviation of some
The next observation shows that any lower bound the maximum cost proven with a location profile with n agents also holds for any profile with n + 1 agents. Clearly this observation can be applied repeatedly to show a lower bound for an arbitrary amount of agents.
Observation 2. Let M be a truthful mechanism which has an additive error of ǫ for any profile with n + 1 agents for the maximum cost. Then there exists some truthful mechanism M ′ which has an additive error of ǫ for the the maximum, for any profile with n agents.
Proof. Let M ′ be the mechanism which simulates M based on the location profile for which the last agent is placed together the penultimate agent. That is, for some input
Proof of truthfulness and the additive error follows the same lines as the previous observationTruthfulness holds due to to partial group strategy proofness in M . The maximum error of M and M ′ is the same since the outputted location is the same (
) and the set of the locations in the inputs (the distinct locations in x A , x B ) are the same.
Locating a Single Facility

Randomized Mechanisms
For the single facility problem, Procaccia and Tennenholtz introduced the LRC (left-right-center) mechanism, which chooses x L and x R with probability 1 4 each, and chooses x C with probability 1 2 [23] . They further showed that LRC is truthful-in-expectation and achieves a tight bound for the multiplicative ratio. It is easy to see that LRC achieves an additive error of . We match this bound with a mechanism which extends LRC (called Balanced-LRC or BLRC in short).
The following two definitions set the foundations for the proof of the lower bound.
Definition 3 (5-point mechanism)
. For an arbitrary location profile x, a 5-point mechanism M is one which can only assign a positive probability to a subset of the following 5 points: 0, x L , x C , x R , 1.
We denote the probabilities that M locates the facilities on these points as p 0 , p L , p C , p R , p 1 respectively.
Definition 4 (Symmetric 5-point mechanism).
A 5-point mechanism M is termed symmetric if for any location profile x such that x = 1 − x it holds that p L = p R and p 0 = p 1 .
Theorem 5.
Any randomized truthful in expectation mechanism for locating one facility has an additive error of at least 1 6 for the maximum cost. Proof. We present a lower bound for two agents. First, we show that any truthful in expectation mechanism for 2 agents can be replaced with a 5-point truthful in expectation mechanism while conserving the additive error. Then, we show that we can further restrict ourselves to symmetric 5-point mechanism without increasing the additive error. This characterization is used by a pair of location profiles and a transition between them, yielding the lower bound. Finally, due to Observation 2, this lower bound can be extended to an arbitrary amount of agents -for any number of agents n there does not exist a mechanism with a lower additive error than ′ which also has additive error α for the maximum cost for 2 agents.
Proof. The proof will transform M to M ′ by moving the probability that M allocated to any point z, to the left and right neighbors of z from the set A = {0, x L , x C , x R , 1}, without changing the expected location. The resulting mechanism will clearly be a 5-point mechanism, and the following claims will show that it also preserves truthfulness and the additive error. We start by showing the effect of this transformation on an arbitrary deterministic mechanism M 1 .
For some arbitrary point z, let z 1 , z 2 be its left and right neighbors, respectively, from the set A, that is:
Let Z be the random variable which can take two possible values, z 1 and z 2 , such that
z2−z1 ). For some location profile x, let M 1 be the deterministic mechanism which locates the facility at point z, and let M 2 be the randomized mechanism which locates the facility according to the random variable Z. 
Claim 7. For any
p ∈ [0, z 1 ] ∪ [z 2 , 1],cost p (M 1 , x) = cost p (M 2 , x).
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that
On the other hand, the cost under M 2 is:
Thus, both costs are the same. 
This holds due to Jensen's inequality (for any convex function f and random variable Z:
, since the absolute value is a convex function.
These two claims and truthfulness of M 1 collectively show that if M 1 was truthful, then so is M 2 : let x be a location profile, and let x ′ be the profile after deviation of some
Claim 9.
The maximum cost of x under M 1 is equal to the maximum cost under M 2 .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that z ≤ x C . Therefore, x R incurs the maximum cost under M 1 , and this cost is x R − z. Due to Claim 7, this is also the cost of x R under M 2 . Since in M 2 the probability is split only between points
, then clearly the agent with the maximum cost in M 2 is x R .
To conclude the proof of the lemma, it is only necessary to repeat the above process for any point z / ∈ A which is chosen with a positive probability.
We now show that we can restrict ourselves to symmetric 5 point mechanisms.
Lemma 10. For any truthful in expectation 5-point mechanism M 1 which has an additive error α, there exists a truthful in expectation symmetric 5-point mechanism M 2 which also has an additive error of α.
Proof. Let M 1 be an arbitrary truthful 5-point mechanism which achieves an additive error α. We will define a mechanism M 3 , and use it to construct a truthful in expectation symmetric mechanism M 2 . We start by defining M 3 . For an arbitrary profile x denote the probabilities
respectively. Let M 3 be a 5-point mechanism which does the following: For an arbitrary profile 1 − x, M 3 locates the facility based on points 0, 1
with the following probabilities:
(notice that the leftmost and rightmost points in 1 − x are 1 − x R and 1 − x L respectively). In some sense M 3 can be seen as the "anti-symmetric" mechanism of M 1 .
M 3 is truthful -Assume towards a contradiction otherwise, that is, there exists some x and a beneficial deviation to x ′ . Then, the deviation from 1 − x to 1 − x ′ would have been beneficial in M 1 , in contradiction to the fact that M 1 is truthful. Additionally, following the same logic, the maximum cost of M 3 is equal to that of M 1 (for any profile x in M 3 with error α, the profile 1 − x has an error of α in M 1 ).
Let M 2 be the mechanism which runs M 1 and M 3 with probability 0.5 each. M 2 is a probability distribution over truthful mechanisms, therefore it is necessarily truthful. Also, the maximum cost is the same in M 1 , M 3 , and it is therefore also the maximal cost in M 2 . Finally, by the construction of M 2 it is clearly a symmetric 5-point mechanism.
Now that we have proven that we can focus only on symmetric 5-point mechanisms, we present two location profiles and a transition between them which concludes the proof.
Let
) and x B = (0, 2 3 ) be two location profiles. Let M be a symmetric 5-point mechanism which achieves the optimal additive error.
For profile x A , let the probability of locating the facility on the left (that is 1/3) be p A LR and the probability of locating the facility in the center point (that is 1/2) be p A C . Since the instance is symmetric, the probability of locating the facility on the right point (2/3) will also be p A LR and the probability of locating the facility at 0 and likewise at 1 is p
We have that the cost of the agent located at the left is equal to:
A LR 3 We now consider the profile B. The additive error of the profile is equal to
However, since the mechanism is truthful it holds that
If we assume towards a contradiction that M can achieve an additive error of less than A LR > 1. This is contradiction since in profile A probabilities must sum to 1. We now present a new mechanism, and show that it can achieve a matching upper bound of 1/6: Proof. BLRC is based on two truthful-in-expectation mechanisms -LRC was proven to be truthful in expectation in [23] , and locating the facility on the fixed point 1/2 is clearly truthful as the agents have no influence over the result. Therefore taking a distribution over these two mechanisms is also truthful in expectation.
Definition 11 (BLRC mechanism).
The balanced left-right-center (BLRC) mechanism locates the facility at the point
Proof of the approximation ratio will be based on two lemmas:
Lemma 13. Let x, y be points such that: 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, and let x, x ′ be the following two location profiles: x = (x, y) and
Proof. For the profile x, the optimal mechanism locates the facility at 2 , but the cost of BLRC is: Proof. Given the location profile x, the optimal mechanism locates the facility at z/2 at a maximum cost of z/2. The cost of BLRC is: M C(BLRC, x) = Lemma 13 holds for an arbitrary location profile x with x L = x, x R = y, and Lemma 14 holds for an arbitrary z, and in particular z = y − x, so the error of BLRC with two agents is no more than 1/6. Since the maximum cost always occurs in at least one of the two extreme reports, combining the two lemmata is sufficient to complete the proof for an arbitrary number of agents as well.
Deterministic Mechanisms
We move on to prove a lower bound of 1/4 and a matching upper bound. Recognize that any dictatorship has an additive error of 1/2, by considering x = (0, 1). 1 4 for the maximum cost.
Theorem 15. Any deterministic truthful mechanism M has an additive error of at least
Proof. We first deal with the case where there are two agents, and later extend to an arbitrary number of agents.
Let x = (0, 1). Assume without loss of generality that M (x) = 1/2 + ǫ for some ǫ ≥ 0. Let x ′ = (0, 1/2 + ǫ). The optimum for x ′ is achieved at 1/4 + ǫ/2. Therefore, if the mechanism is to achieve an additive error of less than 1/4, it must locate the facility in (0, 1/2 + ǫ/2). But if this were the case, then the agent at 1/2 + ǫ could benefit by misreporting to 1, which would move the facility precisely to 1/2 + ǫ, contradicting truthfulness.
For the case of more than two agents, consider the profile in which all other agents are precisely at 1/2, and repeat the process above.
This lower bound construction works in similar lines to the lower bound of Theorem 2.2 in [23] . We now present a matching upper bound, a truthful mechanism additive error of The name of this mechanism is inspired by the notion of phantom-voters (in this case -the phantom voter is 0.5) as introduced in [20] . 1 4 for the maximum cost. Proof. It is easy to see that by misreporting, any agent can either not affect the location of the facility, or move it farther away from them.
Theorem 17. Phantom-half is truthful and has an additive error of
For the additive error:
-If x L , x R ≤ 1/2: The optimal mechanism locates the facility at xL+xR 2 for a maximum cost of xR−xL 2 . Phantom-half locates the facility at x R for a cost of x R −x L . The additive error is:
Assume without loss of generality that 1/2 − x L ≥ x R − 1/2. The optimal mechanism locates the facility at . Phantom-half locates the facility at 1/2 for a cost of 1/2 − x L . The additive error is:
. Since x R ≥ 1/2, x L ≥ 0 it holds that:
-If x L , x R > 1/2: This is completely symmetric to the first case.
Extension to Many Facilities
We start by showing a trivial deterministic mechanism, Equal Spread, which achieves an error of no more than 1 2k−1 for both the average cost and the maximum cost. We then show a lower bound of 1 6k for the maximum cost, meaning the bound is Θ(
Afterwards we show two extensions of Equal Spread -PEC, a randomized mechanism which reaches an error of 1 4k−2 for both max-cost and average cost, and EPEC, a deterministic mechanism which reaches an error of 3 8k−4 for the average cost. Finally, we show that for the case of 2 facilities, we can improve the bound of EPEC for the average cost from 1/4 to 1/5 by choosing the "fifths" mechanism, which locates the facilities on the 0.2 and 0.8 percentiles.
Definition 18 (Equal Spread mechanism). The Equal Spread mechanism locates the k facilities on
for odd values of i (such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1). k . An optimal mechanism can locate k − 1 facilities on {x 3 , x 4 , . . . x k+1 }, and locate one facility on the midpoint of x 1 , x 2 (that is, on k from a facility, therefore the error would be at least:
Theorem 19. Equal spread is a deterministic mechanism which achieves an additive error of no more than
Additionally, any mechanism with an error not larger than 1 6k must also designate one facility serve the first two agents (x 1 , x 2 ): If there are no facilities in the segment [0,
Assume without loss of generality that the remaining facility is put at point 1 3k + ǫ for some ǫ ≥ 0. Let x ′ be the location profile in for any j = 2:
The aforementioned arguments also dictate that for any M with error less than
are also designated one facility (that is, there is a facility in the segment [0, Proof. PEC is clearly truthful since the reports have no effect over the outcome. We show the additive error by bounding the additive error of an arbitrary agent located at point x i from above by For the deterministic case we introduce election-parity-equal-cost (EPEC). Like in PEC, facilities there are two options -locating facilities on { i 2k−1 } for even or odd values of i. In order to decide whether to choose the even or odd values, the mechanism counts the amount of agents who prefer each option (based on their reports), and decides based on majority (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
Theorem 23. EPEC is truthful, and achieves an error of
Proof. EPEC is truthful -the agents have 2 options to choose from, and the decision is done based on majority, therefore no agent has an incentive to misreport to a position which prefers the other option. Any misreport which remains within the same option (for instance, declaring x The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Discussion and Open Problems
We examine the problem of truthful facility location under additive errors. We proved tight bounds for one facility, and showed several extensions for multiple facilities.
We believe that there are many interesting directions which were explored for the multiplicative error but remain wide open for the additive error. For instance, exploring additional metric spaces (cycles, trees, etc.), different objective functions (e.g., L 2 ) or other cost functions of the agents (e.g. "obnoxious facility location". In addition, other models can also be researched with this error function in mind, for example voting via mediators (see [5] ) or when voting for a discrete set of candidates (see [10] 
A Analysis of the Fifths mechanism
Both facilities are chosen based on the percentiles of the agents. The mechanism is truthful -for each agent and each of the two facilities, misreporting can either not affect the location of the facility, or cause it to be located farther from the agent. For a given location profile, if the amount of agents is not a multiple of 5, we analyze the case in which we duplicate the location of each agent 5 times. As shown in Observation 1,this does not affect the additive error. We denote the new location profile by x.
Let OP T 1 < OP T 2 be the locations of the two facilities in some optimal mechanism. Let F 1 = x 1/5 , F 2 = x 4n/5 be the locations of the two facilities in the fifths mechanism.
We split the proof to different cases:
We show that this case is not possible.
In the single facility case, the optimal mechanism locates the facility on the median. Therefore, in the two facility case the optimal mechanism divide the agents into two groups: A = {x 1 , . . . x k } and B = {x k+1 . . . x n }, and locates the OP T 1 , OP T 2 on the median of groups A and B respectively. Therefore, either A or B contains at least half of the agents. Assume without loss of generality that |A| ≥ n/2. Therefore there exist at least n/4 agents to the left of the median of OP T 1 , so
In this case we show a series of transitions from x to a different location profile (without changing the location of F 1 and F 2 ) whose additive error can only be greater. We show that the additive error of the new profile is not greater than 0.2.
We now show the transitions, and prove that in each case the difference in the additive error is non-negative. In each step i we denote the current location profile by x i (in the initial stage:x 0 = x). For some agent j let β i j , γ i j be the difference in the costs of the agent at stage i under M and under OP T respectively, that is:
The total difference in the additive error in step i is denoted by
. We show that ∀i : ∆ i ≥ 0. We measure the error based on the fixed locations OP T 1 , OP T 2 , and if the optimal mechanism changes, this makes difference in additive error even higher.
Let C = 
The change in the additive error is:
Move all agents in (F 2 , 1] to F 2 : In this case all agents which move get closer to OP T 2 by the same amount that they get closer to F 2 , that is β 2 j − γ 2 j . Let:
Move all agents in (F 1 , F 2 ) to OP T 2 : In this case each agent j which moves distance δ j , reduces the cost of OP T by δ j and reduces the cost of M by no more than δ j , therefore ∀j : β 3 j ≥ γ 3 j . Let:
Notice that in x 3 all agents are within the segment [F 1 , F 2 ]. The scaling increases all the distances between agents by the same factor, so the additive error of any agent will also increase (by that factor): ∀j : β 
At the end of the process the profile is x 4 . The highest additive error in x 4 is reached in the following configuration (see Figure 2 ): when there are n/5 agents at 0, 3n/5 agents at some point x (the location of OP T 2 ), and n/5 agents at point 1. We now assess the error with respect to the new assignment of OP T (that is, moving OP T 1 to 0), which can only increase the additive error. Assume without loss of generality that x ≥ 1/2.
In this case, OP T 1 = 0, OP T 2 = x. The costs are AC(OP T ) = . Since x ≥ 1/2 the additive error is: Similarly to the previous case, we show a series of transitions which does not decrease the additive error (see Figure 3) . We denote the location profiles with brackets (e.g., x (1) ) do distinguish the notation from the previous case. , and the error increases for agents in (OP T 1 , F 1 ). Let:
The change in the additive error is: ∆ (1) = j (β (2) : Move all agents in (F 1 , F 2 ) to OP T 2 : In this case each agent j which moves distance δ j to OP T 2 , reduces the cost of OP T by δ j and reduces the cost of M by no more than δ j , therefore ∀j : β 
The change in the additive error is: ∆ (2) = j (β : Move all agents in (F 2 , 1] to F 2 . In this case all agents which move get closer to OP T 2 by the same amount that they get closer to F 2 , that is β . The scaling increases all the distances between agents by the same factor, so the additive error of any agent will also increase (by that factor): ∀j : β x At the end of the process, the highest additive error is reached in x (4) in the following configuration (see Figure  4) when there are n/5 agents at point 0 (location of OP T 1 ), one agent at F 1 , 3n/5 agents at OP T 2 and n/5 agents at point 1 (location of F 2 ). We denote the distances x = F 2 − OP T 2 , y = OP T 2 − F 1 and therefore F 1 = 1 − x − y. Denote the cost of the agent at F 1 by α. . Therefore the additive error is 
